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CASENOTES

NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco:

Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors

Receives High Court Approval
INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA) was formulated to
aid in the prevention of labor unrest and obstructions to the free
flow of interstate commerce. These results are achieved through the
use of the collective bargaining process. 2 Under the NLRA, refusal
to bargain collectively constitutes an unfair labor practice. 3 In addition, if an employer unilaterally terminates or alters the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, the employer is deemed to have not
"bargained collectively" under the NLRA.'
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 (BRA) was
formulated to allow a debtor business to attempt to reorganize its
operation. This is accomplished by restructuring the business's finances
"so that it can continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs,
pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." '6 The
ultimate goal of the reorganization is a return to financial health.
One of the tools available to a reorganizing debtor under the BRA
is the ability to assume or reject, with bankruptcy court approval,
any executory contract or lease which is burdensome to the estate.'
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. Id.

§ 151 (declaration of policy).

3. Id. § 158(a)(5).
4. Id. § 158(d).

5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). Chapter
11, the reorganization section of the Act, is codified at §§ 1101-1174.
6. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6179 [hereinafter cited as 1978 CONG. NEWS];
see also In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) (Court review of the policies behind Chapter 11
of the Code.).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982). This section provides, in pertinent part: "Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c),
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The fact that a collective bargaining agreement is regarded as
an executory contract subject to rejection by a Chapter 11 debtor'
creates a conflict between the provisions and policies of the NLRA
and the BRA. Alteration or rejection of the collective bargaining agreement raises two important issues which cannot be conclusively decided
under either the NLRA or the BRA alone. The issues can only be
decided by judicial interpretation of both of these statutory enactments. The questions confronting the courts are: first, given the nature
of the collective bargaining agreement and the policies behind the
NLRA, can a bankruptcy court permit a debtor to unilaterally modify
or reject a collective bargaining agreement; and, second, if the
bankruptcy court has the authority to permit rejection or modification, must the debtor follow the terms of the agreement until the
court gives its approval or can the debtor unilaterally alter or reject
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement before court approval
and not commit an unfair labor practice under the terms of the NLRA?
The Supreme Court addressed these issues in NLRB v. Bildisco
& Bildisco,9 but failed to resolve the conflict between the NLRA and
the BRA. Rather, the Court determined that the provisions of the
BRA were to govern over inconsistent provisions of the NLRA. This
note will examine the Bildisco decision. First, the relevant labor and
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the [bankruptcy] court's approval,
may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."
An executory contract has been defined, for bankruptcy purposes, as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the
contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance
would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973). Congress concluded that an executory contract is a contract "on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 6, 347, reprinted in 1978 CONG. NEws at 6303.
8. A collective bargaining agreement is an executory contract subject to rejection by the trustee under § 365(a) of the BRA. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.03,
At 365-13 (15th ed. 1984); see also Countryman, supra note 7, at 460 (executory
contracts are contracts where performance remains due on both sides). See generally
In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S Clerks
v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), 423
U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Commercial Motor Freight, 27 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1983); In re J.R. Elkins, Inc., 27 Bankr. 862 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); In re
Braniff Airways, 25 Bankr. 216 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982). In these cases the courts
classified collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts subject to rejection
under § 365(a) or its equivalent provision under the old bankruptcy act.
9. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984), aff'g In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
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bankruptcy laws and policies will be examined, followed by a brief

history of the Bildisco conflict, and a discussion of the Third Circuit's
disposition of the case. The Supreme Court's affirmance of the
appellate court's decision will be examined in detail, along with the
dissenting opinion. An analysis of the implications of the Supreme
Court ruling will be presented, and the congressional response to the

Bildisco decision will be set forth, along with its implications.
RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY LAWS AND POLICIES

Bankruptcy proceedings may be initiated by the debtor/business
voluntarily' ° or involuntarily by the debtor's creditors." When a debtor
files a petition for a Chapter 11 reorganization, the court may designate
the debtor as a "debtor in possession"' 2 and permit the debtor to
continue to operate the business under bankruptcy court supervision. '3
The debtor in possession may then work with the creditors of the
business to formulate a plan whereby creditors will be paid,"' and
must file with the court a list of assets and liabilities, a list of all
the creditors, a statement concerning the financial affairs of the debtor,
and a plan for reorganization.' 5

One decision which must be made by the debtor in possession
concerns the fate of any executory contract in force at the time of
the Chapter 11 filing. There are several options available to the debtor
in possession. It can choose to accept the contract and continue to
honor the terms as it did prior to filing for reorganization. It can

seek the bankruptcy court's permission to reject the contract, and
then either honor or ignore its terms while awaiting the court's deci-

sion. Finally, the debtor in possession can accept the benefits of the

contract while delaying the decision whether to accept or reject.' 6 Under

10. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
11. Id. § 303(a), (b).
12. Id. §§ 1101(1), 1107(a).
13. Id. § 1108. In unusual cases, if the bankruptcy court deems it necessary
it will appoint a "trustee in bankruptcy" rather than allowing the debtor, as debtor
in possession, to manage the reorganization. Id. § 1104; see also id. §§ 321, 322, 1108.
14. Id. §§ 1121-1129. While there are differences between the debtor in possession and the trustee in bankruptcy, for the purposes of the issues discussed herein,
the two are equivalent. Id. § 1107(a). The House Report states that the debtor in
possession assumes the role of a trustee, with all of his rights, powers, duties, functions, and limitations. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 6, at 404, reprinted in 1978

CONG.

NEws at 6360.

15. 11 U.S.C. § 1106; see also id.§ 521.
16. The debtor in possession can also choose to do nothing. If the contract
is neither accepted nor rejected, the contract survives the bankruptcy proceedings
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the BRA, the debtor in possession has until a reorganization plan
is confirmed to decide whether to accept or reject an executory contract; however, a creditor can request the bankruptcy court to require
the debtor to make such a determination within a particular limited
time. '
If the debtor waits to make a decision but continues to accept
the benefits of the contract,'" the debtor in possession becomes
obligated to pay for the reasonable value of those services.' 9 If the
debtor in possession decides to accept the executory contract, it accepts

it subject to all expenses and liabilities.2" The BRA classifies the
expenses and liabilities of the accepted executory contract as

administrative expenses, 2 ' which are given the highest priority for
payment.22 Should the debtor in possession decide to reject the contract immediately after filing for reorganization but before court
approval, the rejection is deemed to be a breach which relates back
to immediately before the date of filing the Chapter 11 petition.23

and is binding on the debtor in possession after the discharge is granted. This course
of events is extremely rare. Federal's, Inc., v. Edmonton Inv. Co., 555 F.2d 577,

579 (6th Cir. 1977); see also 2
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365.03, at 365-22 (15th

ed. 1984).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). This section states:
In a case under [Chapter 11] of this title, the trustee may assume or
reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor at any time
before the confirmation of a plan, but the court, on request of any party
to such contract or lease, may order the trustee to determine within a
specified period of time whether to assume or reject such contract or lease.
Id. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor has only 60 days to make such a determination. Id.. § 365(d)(1).
18. In the case of a collective bargaining agreement, accepting the benefits of
the contract may include permitting the employees to continue working and accepting
the benefit of such work. Depending on the contract terms, the value of the benefits
could include what is specified in the contract. In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d
762, 770-71 (3d Cir. 1947); see also In re Mammoth Mart, Inc., 536 F.2d 950, 954-55
(1st Cir. 1976).
19. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174 (1941).
20. See In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 996-97 (3d Cir. 1951).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A). This section states, in pertinent part: "(b) After
notice and hearing, there shall be allowed, administrative expenses . . . including(I)(A) the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including
wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement of
the case;".
22. Id. § 507(a)(1). This section provides that administrative expenses allowed
under § 503(b) are of first priority.
23. Id. § 365(g)(1).
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The same holds true for a court-authorized "breach" of the executory
contract. 4

Under the BRA any actions against the debtor by a creditor con-

cerning claims that originated before the date of the Chapter 11 filing
are automatically stayed.2" Such claims must be submitted to the
bankruptcy court and proven, prior to confirmation of the reorganization plan, or they will be not be allowed.2" While claims arising from
the breach of the executory contract by the debtor in possession arise
after the petition is filed, under the BRA they are treated as if they
arose before the .filing.27 The net result of the administrative procedures

and priority provisions of the BRA is that the party injured by the
rejection of an executory contract must resort to the bankruptcy proceedings for recovery rather than filing a breach of contract action
against the debtor 'in possession. 2"
A notable omission from the BRA has caused considerable con-

fusion and debate over the proper interpretation of section 365(a).

24. Id.
25. Id. § 362(a).
26. Id. §§ 501, 502, 1141. The general rule is that only claims that predate
the bankruptcy petition are allowable.
27. Id. § 502(g). The priorities for payment of claims arising from the breach
of an executory contract are set out in §§ 506 and 507. These priority provisions
take on increased importance when the claims of workers under a rejected collective
bargaining agreement must be relegated among the claims of other creditors. Secured
claims are paid first. Id § 506. Certain unsecured claims are placed in six priority
categories. Id. § 507. Unsecured claims for wages, salaries, vacation time, sick pay,
and severance pay that are earned within 90 days before the date of the Chapter
11 filing are level three priority claims. Id. § 507(a)(3). Unsecured claims for contributions to employee benefit plans are level four priority claims. Id. § 507(a)(4).
Under Chapter 11, the debtor must pay all first and second priority claims in cash
on the effective date of the reorganization plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). The debtor can
provide for deferred payment of third, fourth, and fifth priority claims in the
reorganization plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(B). Sixth priority claims can be deferred for
a period of not more than six years from the date of the assessment of the claim.
Id. § 1129(a)(9)(C). Unsecured claims that are not covered under the priority provisions of § 507 can be subject to "impairment", which may cause the claims to be
deferred or even cancelled. Id. §§ 1123(a)(3), 1124. Unliquidated or contingent claims
are to be estimated if the fixing or liquidation would unduly delay the closing of
the case. Id. § 502(c). Losses to the employees of a rejected collective bargaining
agreement of their fringe benefits or seniority rights would be governed by § 502(c).
For a further discussion on the priority provisions of § 507, see Note, The Bankruptcy
Law's Effect on Collective Bargaining Agreements, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 391, 392-94

(1981); see also 5
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1123.0113], at 1123-7 (treatment of

impaired claims).
28. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1198-99 (1984).
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As was discussed earlier, this subsection allows the debtor in possession to reject or assume executory contracts to which it is a party.29
Prior to the BRA, bankruptcy proceedings were governed by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act).30 Section 313 of the Act, permitting
rejection of a debtor's executory contracts, was the precursor of section 365(a)." The courts have interpreted old section 313 to allow
rejection of collective bargaining agreements.3 2

When Congress enacted the BRA, it specifically dealt with

collective bargaining agreements subject to the Railway Labor Act,"

29. See supra text accompanying note 7.
30. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1976) (repealed)).
31. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 313 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 713 (1976)
(repealed)). The section provided:
Upon the filing of a petition, the court may, in addition to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties conferred and imposed upon it by this chapter(1) permit the rejection of executory contracts of the debtor, upon notice
to the parties to such contracts and to such other parties in interest as the
court may designate[.]
11 U.S.C. § 713 (1976) (repealed).
32. See, e.g., In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1935) (rejection not allowed but recognition that there may be circumstances when
rejection would be allowed); In re Klaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
33. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Congress failed to mention collective bargaining
agreements other than agreements covered by the RLA when it formulated the BRA.
During oral arguments before the Court in the Bildisco case, government counsel
argued that by not specifically dealing with collective bargaining agreements in § 365(a),
Congress implicitly ratified a previous Second Circuit decision regarding rejection.
Justice Rehnquist took issue with the suggestion that Congress was even aware of
the decision, and asked if there was any principle that Congress was aware of all
appellate and Supreme Court decisions. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1195-96.
The Supreme Court has said that, when construing statutes:
Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts
a statute without change. So too, where, as here, Congress adopts a new
law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed
to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law,
at least insofar as it affects the new statute.
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978) (citations omitted), quoted in
Bordewieck & Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by

Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 296 (1983). See infra notes 105-07
and accompanying text for the Court's final disposition of this issue.
Congress did single out collective bargaining agreements subject to the RLA
for special treatment in the BRA when it provided that neither a court nor a trustee
could alter the terms of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA without
following very detailed and specific procedures. Section 1167 provides:
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but failed to state how other collective bargaining agreements were
to be handled. In the absence of a provision changing the treatment
of these agreements in the BRA, courts interpreting section 365(a)
have continued to cite cases decided under section 313 of the Act
as precedent for the proposition that collective bargaining agreements
can be rejected along with other executory contracts.3" At least one
court has gone so far as to say that, for practical purposes, there
35
is no important difference between the two sections.
In summary, the bankruptcy procedures outlined above are
designed to achieve economic efficiency. The debtor, its creditors, its
employees, and the public can all benefit from a Chapter 11
reorganization. 3 6 Such is not the case with a Chapter 7 liquidation,
for when a business liquidates, it ceases as a going concern, leaving
its employees without jobs and limiting creditors to what can be
salvaged from the sale of the business's assets. The costs of the
inevitable losses associated with a Chapter 7 liquidation are eventually
absorbed by the public. However, if the business can be resuscitated
to financial health through reorganization, the employees will keep
37
their jobs and the creditors will recover more of their claims. In
short, reorganization via Chapter 1I is much more economically efficient than liquidation under Chapter 7.38
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee
may change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor
established by a collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway
Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) except in accordance with section 6 of
such Act (45 U.S.C. 156).
11 U.S.C. § 1167 (1982). See infra note 46 and accompanying text for a discussion
of § 6 of the RLA.
34. See, e.g., In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Commercial
Motor Freight, 27 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1983).
35. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 76-77; see also In re David A. Rosow, Inc.,
9 Bankr. 190 (D. Conn. 1981) ("[Tlhere is little if any reason to expect the courts
to apply a less stringent standard to collective bargaining agreements under Section
365 [than under section 313]." Id. at 192, quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.03,; at .365-17).
36. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 77.
37. Id. The court quoted from D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCEss, REFORM

129-30, 142-43 (1971), in which it was shown that

experience under the bankruptcy law prior to the Code demonstrated that priority
creditors usually received full payment in a successful reorganization, but received
less than one-third of their claims in a liquidation. Unsecured creditors realized about
nineteen percent under one-payment plans and ten percent under deferred payment
plans in reorganization, but only received an average of eight percent in liquidation.
In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 77, n.6.
38. Id.at 77.
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The BRA aids this economic efficiency by providing for continued
operation of the business by the debtor in possession, protecting the
debtor from harassment by creditors, and permitting the debtor in
possession to reject executory contracts that are burdensome to the
estate." The policy of achieving maximum economic efficiency by
providing the debtor with flexibility and breathing room must, however,
coexist with the policies and provisions of statutes protecting other
interests, most notably our nation's labor laws.
RELEVANT LABOR LAWS AND POLICIES

Congress, when it formulated the NLRA, recognized that strikes
and other forms of labor unrest can interfere with the free flow of
commerce, and that these undesirable activities are the probable result
of an employer's refusal to allow its employees to organize and bargain
collectively." Congress found that "protection by the law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption."4l Obstructions to the free
flow of commerce were eliminated by "encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives . . . for . . . negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment." '
The importance of the collective bargaining agreement was
recognized by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co.43 wherein the Court stated:
[The collective bargaining agreement] is more than a contract;
it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate .... It calls into being a new common
law-the common law of a particular industry or of a particular
plant .... [The agreement] is an effort to erect a system of industrial

39. Id. The designation of the debtor as a debtor in possession highlights the
goals of economic efficiency that are pervasive throughout the BRA. By having the
person(s) most familiar with the operation of the business continue to operate the
business during the reorganization proceedings, the chances of successful reorganization should be greater than they would be if the court were to appoint a third-party
trustee to manage the affairs. However, if the financial crisis the business finds itself
in was caused by poor management, the BRA remedies the problem by authorizing
the court to appoint a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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self-government. When most parties enter into a contractual relationship they do so voluntarily, in the sense that there is no real
compulsion to deal with one another, as opposed to dealing with

other parties. This is not true of the labor agreement. The choice
is generally not between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship, for that in all probability preexists the negotiations. Rather
it is between having that relationship governed by an agreed-upon
rule of law or leaving each and every matter subject to a temporary
relative strength, at any given
resolution dependent solely upon the
44
moment, of the contending forces.

In order to assure fair and equitable dealing between labor and
management, Congress identified a variety of actions that, when undertaken by either side, would constitute unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA. Under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, an employer
commits an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain collectively
with his employee's representative."' Section 8(d) defines the duty to
bargain collectively, and prohibits midterm modification or termination of a collective bargaining agreement, unless a series of procedural
steps are faithfully followed. 6
44. Id. at 578-79 (citations omitted). The collective bargaining agreement governs
the rules of the workplace as well as the rules. that guarantee economic security for
the workers. Workplace rules include seniority, grievance-arbitration procedures to
settle disputes, disciplinary procedures and no-strike/no-lockout clauses. Economic
rules govern salary, pension plans, medical plans, etc. Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. 1188 (1984).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). Section 8(a), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158,
provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Unfair labor practices by employer. It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in their exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees ..
46. Section 8(d) states that:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of
the employees to meet at reasonable time's and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and
the execution of a written contract'incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided,
That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify
such contract. .

..

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). The section allows modification if the set procedures for
notification and negotiation are followed. Id.
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Therein the conflict between the NLRA and the bankruptcy code
is realized. The BRA, under section 365(a), permits rejection of
executory contracts by a Chapter 11 debtor, and a collective bargaining
agreement is a species of executory contract. The NLRA prohibits
unilateral modification or rejection of collective bargaining agreements
without notice and negotiation. Resolution of the conflict has troubled
the courts for years. It is to these decisions that we now turn.
PRE-Bildisco JUDICIAL HISTORY
No provision of the BRA permits automatic rejection of executory
contracts; section 365(a) allows for rejection only with the bankruptcy
court's consent."7 In the case of the normal executory contract, permission is given after the debtor in possession shows the court that,
in his best judgment, rejection would benefit the estate."8 However,
rejection should not be permitted by the court when the debtor's purpose is to prejudice its creditors, 9 and has been refused when the
The purpose and policies of the NLRA are carried over to another important
labor statute-the Railway Labor Act-with one important addition: the recognition
of the historic importance of our nation's transportation system granted by the
Congress and the courts. Section 2 of the RLA provides that a carrier cannot change
the terms of its collective bargaining agreement without following certain procedures.
45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982). These procedures are set out in § 6 of the RLA. Id. § 156.
Section 6 requires a carrier to follow lengthy procedures for resolving differences
with the union concerning changes in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Section
6 also requires at least 30 days notice to the other party for any intended change
in the rates of pay or working conditions. A conference must be held to discuss
any proposed changes. Pending completion of these procedures, pay rates, working
conditions, and rules must remain the same. Section 5 of the RLA provides that
if either party requests, disputes are to be submitted to the National Mediation Board.
Id. § 155. In the event of a "labor emergency," the Board may initiate mediation
between the parties. Id. The carrier must continue to honor the original agreement,
even if it has expired, while following the procedures set up in § 6. Id. § 156.
See Manning v. American Airlines, Inc., 221 F.'Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd,
329 F.2d 32 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 817 (1964) (while following § 6 procedures any alteration by the carrier of rates of pay, rules, or working conditions
is forbidden). Failure to abide by the provisions of the RLA would be an unfair
labor practice.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
48. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
365.03 (15th ed. 1984). The requirement of
a showing that, in the best business judgment of the debtor, rejection of the contract would benefit the estate is the "business judgment" test. For a definition of
executory contracts, see supra note 7.
49. Countryman, supra note 7, at 450-51; see also Group of Inst. Investors
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523 (1943) (allowance
of rejection).
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debtor's sole purpose for filing for Chapter 11 reorganization was
to void the collective bargaining agreement. 5"
As previously discussed, in the Supreme Court's view, the
collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary executory contract,"
but rather is one with a unique status. 2 It covers the entire employment relationship and creates what the Court has termed "a new common law" of the particular industry or plant. 3 In light of the Supreme
Court's view the lower courts have adopted a more stringent test for
bargaining agreements than the usual "business
rejecting collective
54
test.
judgment"
The history of rejection of collective bargaining agreements draws
its early chapters from cases like In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc.,"
where the court refused to allow rejection of a bargaining agreement
between the debtor and union.56 The court questioned whether the
debtor had filed for bankruptcy simply to void the agreement. 57 The
significance of the case is twofold: first, the court refused to allow
rejection when it felt the debtor's main purpose in filing for bankruptcy
was to avoid the collective bargaining agreement; and second, the court
recognized that there might be circumstances where the collective
bargaining agreement could be rejected. The same district court later
formulated a test for rejection of a collective bargaining agreement
when it decided In re Klaber Brothers.5 9 To reject a collective bargaining agreement, the court said, the debtor must "be able to show
that rejection would be beneficial to the estate.6" Shortly thereafter
another United States district court, in In re Overseas National
Airways set forth a standard for rejection of a collective bargaining
50. In re Tinti Constr. Co., 29 Bankr. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1983) (use of
Chapter 11 for sole purpose of rejecting collective bargaining agreement and not
for the purpose of reorganizing was not proper).
51. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)
(questioned whether a clause of the collective bargaining agreement survived a corporate merger); see also supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
52. See Shopmen's Local No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698, 703
(2d Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 703, n.9, (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 579 (1960)).
54. See supra note 48.

55. 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
56. Id. at 480.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 479-80.

59. 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
60. Id. at 85.
61. 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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agreement. The now refined test allowed rejection "only after thorough
scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides." 62
Ten years later, the Second Circuit decided Shopmen's Local
Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products.63 The Kevin Steel court concluded that collective bargaining agreements could be rejected, adopting
the Overseas National Airways test of careful scrutiny and balancing
of the equities." Within weeks, the Kevin Steel court again addressed
the issue of rejection of collective bargaining agreements and appeared
to restrict its earlier test, making it more difficult for the debtor to

"pass". The most recent test, applied by the Second Circuit
in Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks v. REA Express,65 requires a troubled carrier to show that rejection will be the lesser of
two evils (liquidation or no agreement) and that the carrier will col-

lapse and its employees will lose their jobs if rejection is not allowed. 66
62. Id. at 361.
63. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 706-07. The Kevin Steel test requires the courts to thoroughly scrutinize
the situation and carefully balance the equities on both sides. Id. This formulation
was thought to accommodate the statutory policies of the NLRA by requiring a greater
evidentiary showing than that required by the "business judgment" test while at the
same time not violating the provisions of the BRA. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79.
65. 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), 423 U.S. 1073
(1976).
66. Id. at 172. The apparent departure of the Second Circuit from its earlier
Kevin Steel test has led to much consternation and conjecture among the commentators and the courts. The court could have concluded that its previous decision was
too unsympathetic to labor's side of the issue and thus attempted to ameliorate any
bias with the more difficult REA Express test. A more probable explanation emerges
from the distinguishing characteristics of the cases. The most important distinction
was that the Kevin Steel agreement was subject to the provisions of the NLRA while
the REA Express agreement fell under the protection of the RLA. As was noted
earlier, Congress carved out an exception for collective bargaining agreements subject to the RLA, giving them special treatment. See supra notes 33-34. Under the
old Bankruptcy Act, under which both Kevin Steel and REA Express were decided,
a similar provision (§ 77(n)) specifically prohibited bankruptcy courts or trustees from
changing wages or working conditions of railroad employees except as allowed in
§ 151 of the RLA. 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1976) (repealed). Section 77(n) read: "No
judge or trustee acting under this title shall change the wages or working conditions
of railroad employees except in the manner proscribed in sections 151 to 163 of
Title 45, as amended June 21, 1934, or as they may hereafter be amended." Id.
See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the requirements
of the RLA.
The Second Circuit in REA Express did not narrow its holding to RLA cases,
but an implicit narrowing could be argued, in light of the historical deference given
to railroads and the special status granted RLA collective bargaining agreements in
the Bankruptcy Act. The REA Express court itself said:
In [Kevin Steel] we held that § 313(1) permits the bankruptcy court to
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In re Alan Wood Steel67 further refined the REA Express test, holding
that a two-step analysis must be employed before rejection can be
allowed: first, the bankruptcy court must determine that the agree-

ment is so onerous and burdensome that failure to reject it will make

a successful reorganization impossible; and, second, the equities involved must favor the debtor."
FACTS OF THE CASE

On April 14, 1980, Bildisco and Bildisco, a New Jersey partnership engaged in the sale and distribution of building supplies,
authorize a trustee or debtor-in-possession to reject a collective bargaining
agreement governed by the National Labor Relations Act.. . . In the present
case we similarly hold that executory collective bargaining agreements subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act ... may be rejected....

523 F.2d at 166 (citations omitted; emphasis added). The REA Express court later
said: "The central question before us in this case is whether a collective bargaining
agreement subject to the Railway Act . . . is governed by the same principles [as

rejection of agreements under the NLRAJ." 523 F.2d at 168 (emphasis added). The
test adopted by the REA Express court also implicitly narrowed the holding to RLA
agreements: "[Permission to reject is predicated on a showing] that an onerous and
burdensome executory collective bargaining agreement will thwart efforts to save a
failing carrier in bankruptcy from collapse. . .

."

Id. 'at 169 (emphasis added).

Rejection under the REA Express test is allowed "only where it clearly appears to
be the lesser of two evils and that, unless the agreement is rejected, the carrier will
collapse." Id. at 172 (emphasis added). Arguably, then, the REA Express test was
meant to apply only to collective bargaining agreements under the RLA, providing
them with the special deference Congress intended, while the less restrictive Kevin
Steel test was to apply to collective bargaining agreements under the NLRA.
The Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve the reasoning behind the REA
Express test when it decided Bildisco. The Court simply held that the REA Express
test for rejection
is fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into
Chapter 11 6f the Bankruptcy Code. The rights of workers under collectivebargaining agreements are important, but the REA Express standard subordinates the multiple, competing considerations underlying a Chapter 11
reorganization to one issue: whether rejection of the collective-bargaining
agreement is necessary to prevent the debtor from going into liquidation.
The evidentiary burden necessary to meet this stringent standard may not
be insurmountable, but it will present difficulties to the debtor-in-possession that will interfere with the reorganization process.
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1196 (1984).
The Court may have left the door open, then, for an argument that Bildisco
involved an agreement under the NLRA and that the Court's language in Bildisco
meant only that the REA Express test cannot be used for agreements that fall under
the NLRA. The question as to whether the REA Express standard is applicable to
agreements governed by the RLA remains open.
67. 449 F. Supp. 165 (E.D.Pa. 1978).
68. Id. at 169.
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voluntarily filed for a Chapter 11 reorganization. The bankruptcy
court designated the partnership "debtor in possession" and authorized
it to continue to operate the business. 9 At the time, Bildisco
and Local 408 of the Teamsters Union were parties to a collective
bargaining agreement which covered eighteen of Bildisco's employees.
Shortly thereafter, on July 31, in response to charges leveled by
the Teamsters,7" the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint against Bildisco. The NLRB complaint
charged that Bildisco, both as employer and debtor in possession,
had engaged in unfair labor practices by unilaterally changing the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement. 7" Later, based on additional
complaints and allegations, an amended complaint was issued. Bildisco
failed to respond to either complaint. 7"
On January 5, 1981, the partnership, as debtor in possession,
asked the bankruptcy court for permission to reject the collective
bargaining agreement. 73 Ten days later this motion was granted. The
rejection was made retroactive to April 13, 1980, the day immediately
preceding the date the bankruptcy petition was filed.74

69. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 75 (3d Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 75-76. The charges were, in essence, that Bildisco had failed to honor
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement both before and after filing for
Chapter 11 reorganization. The charges included allegations that Bildisco had failed
to grant wage increases called for by the collective bargaining agreement, failed to
pay pension and welfare contributions, and failed to pay over union dues. Id.
71. Id. at 76. The NLRB set up a hearing for seven months later and advised
Bildisco to respond to the complaint within ten days of service or all of the allegations would be deemed admitted. Bildisco did not respond. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 75. Permission to reject the agreement was requested pursuant to
§ 365(a) of the BRA. See supra note 7 for a discussion of § 365(a). One of Bildisco's
partners, Sal Valente, was the only witness to testify at the hearing on the motion
to reject the agreement with the Teamsters. Id. He testified that Bildisco's creditors
were worried about the "union situation" and that Bildisco could save about $100,000
in 1981 if it could escape the agreement. By the date of the hearing, the number
of Teamsters working for Bildisco had decreased to three as a result of the offseason. Valente testified that as the off-season ended, the workers would be hired
back until Bildisco employed ten Teamsters. Id. n.2. Valente's projected savings were
based on these ten employees.
74. Id. at 75. See § 365(g)(1) which provides:
(g) Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) [pertaining to lessee in
possession] and (i)(2) [pertaining to purchaser in possession] of this section,
the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease(1) if such contract or lease has not been assumed under this section
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Then, on January 27, 1981, the General Counsel of the NLRB
requested a summary judgment on its complaint, due to Bildisco's
failure to answer. Bildisco responded that the bankruptcy proceedings
had disrupted its attempt to file an answer, and that the bankruptcy
court had not given Bildisco permission to hire special labor counsel."
At this point Bildisco informed the Board of the bankruptcy court's
approval of Bildisco's request to reject the collective bargaining agreement. Based on this, Bildisco argued that since the rejection of the
agreement related back to the date immediately preceding the date
of the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, there was in fact no collective bargaining agreement in force between the debtor in possession
and the Teamsters when the alleged violations occurred. Furthermore,
Bildisco argued, if there were any claims against Bildisco based on
its actions before the Chapter 11 petition was filed, they should be
administered
through the bankruptcy proceedings rather than a NLRB
76
hearing.
Citing Bildisco's failure to file a timely answer and ruling that
the debtor in possession was an alter ego to Bildisco in bankruptcy,
the NLRB granted the motion for summary judgment. The Board
ordered Bildisco to make all delinquent payments, with interest, and
to honor the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 77
On May 4, 1981, the district court rejected the union's appeal.
and affirmed the bankruptcy court's order allowing rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement. Both this decision and the NLRB
ruling were appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.78

APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF THE CASE

The appellate court began its opinion by noting that issues
surrounding the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under
the new bankruptcy code came before the court as a matter of first
impression. 9 Judge Aldisert described the task of the court as
reconciling "the apparent conflict between the NLRA and the
Bankruptcy Code and the policies they represent." 80
or under a plan confirmed under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title,
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition; . .
11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) (1982).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 76.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
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The court examined the legislative history behind section 365 of the Code and determined that Congress did not intend collective
bargaining agreements to be unique among executory contracts.'
Significance was attached to the fact that, despite many cases allowing
rejection of collective bargaining agreements, Congress chose not to
give these agreements special treatment. 2 Because Congress did pro-

vide for certain types of executory contracts83 and called for special
treatment of collective bargaining agreements governed by the Railway

Labor Act 8 ' the court drew the inference that "with .. . one excep-

tion, Congress did not intend to distinguish collective bargaining

agreements from executory contracts in general." 8 '
Having accepted that collective bargaining agreements may be
rejected in a bankruptcy reorganization, the court turned to delineating
the standards to be applied by the bankruptcy court in determining
whether to permit or deny rejection. The court considered three possible
tests to evaluate the debtor in possession's claim that rejection was
necessary:1 6 the "business judgment" test,8" the test set out in Kevin
Steel8 and the REA Express test.8
81. Id.
82. Id. The court cited the following cases as examples of decisions allowing
rejection: Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d 312 (2d
Cir. 1976); Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d
164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), 423 U.S. 1073 (1976); Shopmen's
Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prods., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975); Local
Joint Executive Bd., AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, 419 F. Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1976),
aff'd, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. The provisions of the BRA that the court referred to as evidence of Congress's intent to provide for only certain types of executory contracts were §§ 365(b)(3),
765 and 766. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 78. Section 365(b)(3) is concerned with adequate
assurance of performance of shopping center leases. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3) (1982).
Sections 765 and 766 are concerned with transactions in commodity futures contracts. Id. §§ 765, 766. The court's reasoning was that since shopping center leases
and commodities futures contracts are executory contracts for which Congress specially
provided when it drafted the new code, if Congress had meant to specially provide
for collective bargaining agreements in the BRA, it would have done so in a similarly expressed manner.
84. Id. The court quoted § 1167 of the BRA. Id. See supra note 33 for the
pertinent text of § 1167.
85. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 78.
86. Id.at 79.
87. Id. See supra note 48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business
judgment test.
88. 519 F.2d 698, 707 (2d Cir. 1975); see also supra note 64 and accompanying
text.
89. 523. F.2d 164 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), 423 U.S. 1073
(1976); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Noting the historic importance attached to workers' rights issues,
and pointing to the possible highly adverse effects rejection of a
collective bargaining agreement could have, the court rejected the
business judgment test.9" In deference to the workers' concerns, the
court felt a more stringent test was called for.
The Kevin Steel test calls for " 'thorough scrutiny, and a careful
balancing of the equities on both sides.' "9 In addition to these
requirements, the REA Express test, as modified by In re Alan Wood
Steel, demands that failure to allow rejection make reorganization
impossible, and that the balance of equities favor the debtor.92 The
court rejected the more stringent REA Express test, stating that it
was "entirely unrealistic" to attempt to evaluate the possible future
success or failure of reorganization, and that the test placed the value
of continuation of the collective bargaining agreement above the more
important issue of whether the employees would continue to have jobs
at all. 93 Instead, the court adopted the Kevin Steel test, with the
following statement:
We accept this formulation of the appropriate relationship
between the competing statutory policies. It accommodates the
statutory policies of the Labor Act by demanding a greater
evidentiary showing than for rejection of a typical executory contract, but it does not erect impossible barriers to rejection of labor
contracts in violation of the policies underlying Chapter 11. It plots
a middle course between the possible extremes, requiring a sensitive
weighing of the competing private and public interests in the context of the particular case.9 '
In applying the test for rejection, the court indicated that the
threshold determination is whether the debtor in possession has
demonstrated that continuation of the collective bargaining agreement
will be burdensome to the estate. Once this is established, the debtor
in possession must produce the evidence necessary for the court to
balance the equities involved. While attempting to strike an equitable
90. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79.

91. Id. (quoting Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707, and Overseas Airways, 238 F.

Supp. at 361).
92. REA Express, 523 F.2d at 167-69; In re Alan Wood Steel, 449 F. Supp.
at 169.
93. 682 F.2d at 80. It is significant that the discussion of the Third Circuit
concerning the Alan Wood Steel and REA Express test neglects to mention the fact
that REA Express court was dealing with a collective bargaining agreement subject
to the RLA, not the NLRA. See supra note 66.
94. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 79.
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balance between the claims arising from the agreement and other claims
against the debtor, the court must decide whether rejection will help
the debtor in possession to achieve a satisfactory reorganization. 5
While the appellate court did adopt a test for rejection, it did
not attempt to apply it to the facts of the case. Since the bankruptcy
court had failed to elaborate on what test it had applied, the appellate
court felt unable to determine whether there was legal error sufficient to demand reversal. Accordingly, the Third Circuit vacated the
judgment of the district court and remanded the case back to the
bankruptcy court for reconsideration in light of the adopted test.9 6
During the case the union had argued that any modifications of
the collective bargaining agreement, either before or after a Chapter
11 filing, could only be made in compliance with section 8(d) of the
NLRA. Since Bildisco unilaterally modified the agreement9 7 without
following the procedures outlined in section 8(d), the union felt that
the debtor in possession had committed an unfair labor practice. The
union and the NLRB both had argued that Bildisco was required to
follow the terms of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA before making
changes in the agreement, and its failure to do so constituted an unfair
labor practice. 98 The NLRB's summary judgment of its complaint
against Bildisco reflected these views.
In refusing to enforce the summary judgment against Bildisco,
the Third Circuit ruled that the debtor in possession was not governed
by the provisions of the NLRA because the debtor in possession was
"a new entity, separate and apart from the pre-bankruptcy company"
95. Id. at 80. The equities to be balanced by the court include the fact that
under the NLRA the debtor in possession is still an employer and is required to
negotiate with his employees' representative, even if the bankruptcy court authorizes
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement. These employees have the right to
strike if the negotiations do not prove fruitful, and the threat of a strike and its
consequences for the business are among the equities to be balanced. Also, § 365(a)
of the BRA provides that rejection of the agreement by the debtor in possession
is a breach of the agreement, giving the employees a claim for damages against the
employer for the benefits lost under the agreement. The court should balance the
impact the claim for damages would have on the debtor against the adequacy of
relief that the employees would obtain through the bankruptcy claims procedures.
The court should look as well to whether or not the parties acted in good faith
when the insolvency of the company became apparent; how the employees' benefits
and salaries compare to the industry average; and what percentage of employees are
covered by the agreement. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 80 n.12.
96. Id. at 82.
97. See supra note 70 for a discussion of the modifications made by Bildisco.
to the agreement.
98. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 82-83.
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and did not become a party to the collective bargaining agreement/executory contract until it had expressly assumed it.99 The court then
reasoned that the NLRB erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in granting the motion for summary judgment. The request for
99. Id. at 78-79. The court cited Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975),
which had also utilized the new-entity theory, as support for its holding that Bildisco
as debtor in possession was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement and
therefore was not bound by § 8(d). The court further developed its new-entity theory
later in the case, when it dismissed the NLRB's request for enforcement of its order
following the summary judgment against Bildisco. Id. at 82-83. The court again cited
Kevin Steel, and reviewed the legislative history of Chapter 11. That history makes
it clear that the debtor in possession is essentially the same as the trustee. Id. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
In Kevin Steel, the Second Circuit dealt with a request to reject a collective
bargaining agreement under § 313(1) of the old Bankruptcy Act and a union's argument that § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) of the NLRA precluded rejection absent compliance
with those sections. The court reasoned that a debtor in possession is not the same
entity as the pre-bankruptcy company. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704. The court pointed
out that a new entity is created by the bankruptcy laws, and the new entity has its
own rights and duties, and is subject to the supervision of the bankruptcy court.
Included in the duties of the new entity is the duty to continue to comply with the
NLRA. The trustee may be required to continue to bargain with the representative
that the employees had before the bankruptcy petition was filed, and if an agreement is then reached, its termination would be covered by § 8(d). The Second Circuit
noted that these duties were very similar to the duties of a successor employer, who
is not bound by his predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. See NLRB v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 281-91 (1972) (a successor employer generally is required to bargain with the union but is not a party to his predecessor's collective
bargaining agreement unless he assumes it). The Kevin Steel court concluded its newentity analysis by saying that the debtor in possession is not required to assume the
outstanding collective bargaining agreement, because if it was, it would be in a worse
position than the successor employer. The court held that until the debtor in possession assumes the outstanding labor contract, it is not a party to the contract and
is not bound by the requirements of § 8(d) of the NLRA. Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704.
In Bildisco, the Third Circuit, after citing Kevin Steel and Burns Sec., ruled
that since Bildisco as debtor in possession was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement under the new-entity theory, Bildisco had the authority to reject
the collective bargaining agreement without following the requirements of § 8(d). This
rejection did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 83.
The new-entity theory has met with criticism. Bordewieck and Countryman
presented three reasons why the theory does not make sense. First, they claimed
the "new entity" is bound by his contractual obligations until the time the court
says that he can reject the contracts. If the court does not approve rejection, he
will still be bound by those contract obligations, even though he has not "assumed"
them, as is required by the new-entity theory. Second, the Supreme Court has stated
that successor employers are bound by predecessors' collective bargaining agreements
when there is a substantial continuity of the business enterprise, as is the case with
a debtor in possession-and is certainly the case in Bildisco. Third, if the debtor
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enforcement was denied without prejudice.'0 ° Both the union and the
NLRB appealed and certiorari was granted.1 01
SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF THE CASE

In a majority opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court affirmed the appellate court's view as to the ability of a debtor
in possession to reject a collective bargaining agreement. The Court
unanimously agreed that the bankruptcy court may permit rejection
of a collective bargaining agreement along with other executory contracts. The Court split, however, as to whether an unfair labor practice is committed by a debtor who rejects an agreement during the
interim before court approval, with the majority holding that no violation of the NLRA occurs.' 0 ,
In holding that a collective bargaining agreement can be rejected
with bankruptcy court approval, the Court agreed with the Third
Circuit's view that the bankruptcy code itself exhibits a congressional
desire to include collective bargaining agreements governed by the

NLRA in the category of executory contracts which can be rejected. 0 3

in possession was required to "assume" a collective bargaining agreement before
it was required to honor it, and is not a party to the agreement otherwise, why
would the debtor in possession need to seek court approval to reject an agreement
to which it was not a party? See Bordewieck & Countryman, supra note 33, at 332.
It is less difficult to justify the new-entity theory when dealing with a trustee
in bankruptcy appointed by the court who truly is a "new entity" running the business
than when, as in the case of Bildisco, the same individual runs the business before
and after the petition for bankruptcy is filed, and yet through some wave of the
judicial wand is reincarnated as a "new entity". For a case that rejected the newentity theory for these reasons, see In re Brada Miller Freight Sys., 702 F.2d 890
(11th Cir. 1983) (rejected new-entity theory but retained balancing of the equities test).
In fact, the Supreme Court dismissed the new-entity theory, apparently
recognizing the same faults with the theory as did Bordewieck and Countryman.
However, the Court replaced the reasoning of the new-entity theory with equally
weak logic. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1197 (1984); see also
infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
100. Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 84-85.
101. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 103 S. Ct. 784 (1983).
102. Id. at 1197-1201; see also id. at 1205-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1194-97. The Court reviewed the text of § 365(a) of the BRA and
concluded, as did the appellate court, that the term "executory contracts" as used
in the section included collective bargaining agreements covered by the NLRA. Id.
at 1194. The Supreme Court also agreed that the fact that Congress singled out
collective bargaining agreements covered by the RLA for special treatment in § 1167
of the Code but did not do the same for NLRA collective bargaining agreements
was evidence of congressional intent not to make special provisions for NLRA
agreements. Id. at 1194-95.
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In addition, the Court indicated that given the nature of the collective bargaining agreement, the standard for rejection should be stricter

than the business judgment test but not as oppressive as the REA
Express standard. 0'° It did, however, somewhat stiffen the test to be

applied when considering a motion to reject such an agreement.

The Supreme Court adopted the appellate court's standard, per-

mitting rejection of the collective bargaining agreement under section
365(a) "if the debtor can show that the collective bargaining agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities
balance in favor of rejecting the labor contract,"'' 0 but added an
additional consideration. Before a bankruptcy court may act on a
petition requesting permission to reject or accept the collective bargaining agreement, it must be persuaded that reasonable efforts to
negotiate voluntary modifications to the agreement have been made,
and must be further convinced that these negotiations are not likely
to produce a prompt and satisfactory solution.'0 6 The Supreme Court
felt that the NLRA's policies required that the parties to a collective

bargaining agreement attempt to negotiate changes between themselves,
and that the bankruptcy court need only step in if a stalemate in
the negotiations "threatens to impede the success of the debtor's
reorganization."10 "

104. Id.at 1195-96. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the business judgment and REA Express standards for rejection or assumption.
The Court disagreed with the argument made by the Board that Congress was
aware of the REA Express test when it formulated § 365(a) and therefore implicitly
had adopted the REA Express test into the BRA. Id. at 1196. The Court dismissed
the REA Express test as being "fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility
and equity built into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code." Id. In addition, the
Court indicated that the test subordinated all of the considerations and interests
involved in a reorganization to the one issue of whether rejection of the agreement
would be necessary to prevent liquidation. The Court felt that this would cause an
evidentiary hurdle to the debtor in possession which might interfere with the
reorganization process. Id.
105. Id.at 1196.
106. Id.
107. Id.at 1196-97. The Court grounded its negotiation requirement in the duty
to bargain created by § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA as well as the congressional desire to
prevent labor unrest and encourage collective bargaining, as stated in 29 U.S.C. § 151.
Additionally, the Court cited Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel Employees, 417 U.S.
249 (1974) and NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972), as examples
of cases which held that parties to a collective bargaining agreement should be free
to negotiate without governmental interference. Bildisco, 104 S.Ct. at 1196.
The Court also believed that the bankruptcy courts should not be required to
move into areas in which it has little or no expertise. This was the Court's reason
for not requiring the bankruptcy court to make a determination that the parties have
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The appellate court's determination that the debtor in possession
does not commit an unfair labor practice by unilaterally rejecting the
collective bargaining agreement prior to formal bankruptcy court
approval of rejection was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The majority
found, in agreement with the Third Circuit, that after the Chapter
11 petition is filed and until formal acceptance of its terms by the
debtor in possession, the collective bargaining agreement is not an
enforceable contract within the meaning of the NLRA.'0I The Court,
however, offered some different reasons for its holding.
While the appellate court made much effort to explain the mystical
workings of its "new entity" theory, the Supreme Court summarily
dismissed it."09 The majority instead ruled that the debtor in possession was the same entity as before the Chapter 11 filing, but that
now it was "empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code to deal
withits contracts and property in a manner it could not have done
absent the bankruptcy filing."' 10
bargained to an impasse before ruling on a request to reject an agreement. Id.at
1197. Yet, it would appear that a bankruptcy court is equally ill-equipped to determine the probable cause for failure of negotiations, or whether the solution achieved
through the negotiations is "satisfactory".
The Court also required the bankruptcy courts to determine whether reorganization 'will be successful if rejection is allowed. In analyzing a successful reorganization, the interests of all of the parties affected by the bankruptcy and the degree
and quality of hardship faced by each of the parties must be balanced. The relevant
factors include the likelihood that the debtor will be forced to liquidate if rejection
is not allowed, the impact of liquidation upon the debtor, the reduced value of other
creditor's claims if the collective bargaining agreement is affirmed, the hardship
imposed upon creditors by the affirmance of the agreement, and the impact of rejection on the employees. Id.
108. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
109. Id.at 1197.
110. Id.The results of this reasoning appear to be the same as the results of
the "new-entity" theory. According to the majority, the collective bargaining agreement becomes unenforceable not because the debtor in possession is a "new entity"
and therefore not a party to the agreement, but because the design of the BRA makes
the agreement unenforceable within the meaning of § 8(d). Therefore, the debtor
in possession is not obligated to follow § 8(d). Id.
The dissenting opinion pointed out that the term "unenforceable contract"
appears nowhere in § 8(d), and concluded that the majority must have meant that
the agreement is not "in effect" after the Chapter 11 petition. The dissenters argued
that while the agreement may not be enforceable during the interim period, it is
most certainly in effect. They pointed out that the agreement which the majority
classified as not in effect or "unenforceable" will support claims arising from the
debtor's obligations under the agreement during the post-petition period, regardless
of the ultimate disposition of the agreement. To support their position, the dissenters
pointed out that if the agreement were assumed by the debtor in possession, the
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Armed with the "powers" granted by the bankruptcy code, the
debtor in possession can decide to reject its collective bargaining
agreement."' According to the majority, not only can the agreement
be rejected, but rejection during the interim before final court approval
2
does not run afoul of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The Court found
support for this position, as did the lower court, in the provisions
of the BRA itself." 3 These provisions were read as evidence of congressional intent that unilateral interim-period rejection be allowed.
Any other result, according to the Court, "would largely, if not completely, undermine whatever benefit the debtor-in-possession other-4
wise obtains by its authority to request rejection of the agreement.""

assumption would relate back to the Chapter 11 filing date, and compensation earned
by the employees under the agreement would become first priority administrative
expenses. Under § 365(g) of the BRA, if the agreement is rejected, that rejection
relates back to the date immediately preceding the Chapter 11 filing and the employees
will have damages resulting from the breach of the agreement which they can claim
in the bankruptcy proceedings. Also, if services under the agreement are accepted,
the estate becomes liable for the value of the services-usually measured by the rates
set forth in the agreement. Id. at 1206-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun,
Marshall, and White joined in the dissent.
111. Id. at 1197. The Court took the position that the "authority to reject an
executory contract is vital to the basic purpose [of] a Chapter 11 reorganization"
since a debtor can shed burdensome obligations that may impede the reorganization.
Id. at 1198. Thus, according to the majority, the basic purpose behind Chapter
11-efficient use of economic resources-is best served by allowing the debtor in
possession to reject the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 1197-98.
The dissent argued that rejection of a collective bargaining agreement before
court approval is not vital to the reorganization of the debtor. It maintained that
the probable labor strife caused by violating the agreement would do more to harm
the chances for reorganization. Additionally, if the agreement was overly burdensome, the bankruptcy court would undoubtedly permit rejection under the Bildisco
test. Id. at 1209 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1198. Recall that § 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse
to bargain collectively with the employee's representative. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
113. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1198. The Court found congressional intent in the
provisions of § 365(d)(2) (in Chapter 11, the debtor has until the reorganization plan
is confirmed to decide the disposition of its executory contracts) and § 365(d)(1) (trustee
in liquidation must make a decision within 60 days) of the BRA that a debtor in
possession in reorganization is to be given more freedom to decide whether or not
to reject an agreement than is a trustee in liquidation. Id. Other provisions of the
BRA cited as support by the majority included the proof of claims provisions (§§ 501,
502, 1141), the automatic stay provision (§ 362(a)), and the relation-back provision
(§ 365(g)(1)) (relation-back of the breach of the agreement to the date immediately
before the Chapter 11 filing). Id. As to this last provision, the Court held that the
relation-back provision "involves more than just priority of claims." Id. at 1199.
114. Id. at 1198.
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As a result of these BRA provisions and congressional intent, the
Court reasoned that from the filing of the Chapter 11 petition until
formal acceptance of the collective bargaining agreement, the agreement was not an enforceable contract within the meaning of section
8(d)."
Since the agreement is not enforceable, the majority concluded
that the NLRB could not begin administrative proceedings against
the debtor in possession that would result in the agreement being
enforced." ' In addition, the Union's argument that the mid-term
modification procedures of section 8(d) must be followed by the debtor
in possession before it can seek court approval for rejection was
dismissed by the Court. The Court concluded that it was not necessary
for the debtor in possession to follow specific procedures to modify
an unenforceable agreement." ' Also, the Court pointed out that section 8(d) applies to unilateral actions by the debtor in possession that

alter the terms of an agreement, and that here the cause of the altera-

tions of the agreement with the Teamsters was the action of the
BRA."18
115. Id. at 1199.
116. Id. The Court ruled that although the NLRB's action against Bildisco was
to enforce § 8(d) of the NLRA, the net result of the administrative proceedings against
Bildisco would be to force Bildisco to honor the terms of the agreement-and the
agreement is not enforceable after the Chapter 11 petition is filed. In addition, the
Court believed that such a result would be contrary to the policy behind the BRA:
to give the debtor flexibility and breathing space. Id.
The dissent had difficulty understanding how enforcement of § 8(d) would
interfere with the policies of flexibility and breathing space. Justice Brennan assumed
that the majority was concerned that a debtor in possession, faced with the prospect
of unfair labor charges, may make a premature decision concerning the agreement.
He argued that § 365(d)(2) provided evidence of congressional intent that the debtor
in possession not be given an unlimited time to consider his choice. Since the employees
will lose their jobs if liquidation is necessary, the debtor in possession should be
able to negotiate an agreement at least as favorable as the rejected agreement. Hence,
the problem of prematurely rejecting a "good" agreement is illusory. Id. at 1209-10
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1200.
118. Id. The Union argued that the debtor in possession was required to follow
the mid-term modification procedures of § 8(d). The Court noted that it was not
modifications made by the debtor in possession that altered the agreement here, but
rather the operation of the bankruptcy law that permitted Bildisco to reject the agreement. In addition, the Court dismissed the Union's position that the debtor in possession must bargain to impasse before requesting permission to reject from the bankruptcy court. The Court stated that since the debtor in possession was not required
to follow the mid-term modification provisions of § 8(d), "any corresponding duty
to bargain to impasse under § 8(a)(5) and § 8(d) before seeking rejection must also
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In concluding the majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist pointed
out that a Chapter 11 reorganization petition does not provide
immunity from all of the provisions of the NLRA. The debtor in
possession is classified as an "employer" by the NLRA and must
'
continue to negotiate with its employee's representatives. 19
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 reorganization may find
that, in order to assure reorganization, it must obtain from the
bankruptcy court permission to reject certain executory contracts. In
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco2 ° the Supreme Court found that the

debtor in possession may seek rejection of a collective bargaining agreement along with other executory contracts. The Court required the
application of the following standards to determine if rejection is
warranted. First, the debtor in possession must show that the agreement burdens the estate and that after careful scrutiny the equities
involved balance in favor of rejection. In balancing the interests of
the affected parties, the bankruptcy court must consider the likelihood
that the debtor will be forced to liquidate absent rejection, and the
be subordinated to the exigencies of bankruptcy." Id. Requiring the bankruptcy court
to make determinations as to the extent of bargaining removes the court from its
field of expertise. Id.
119. Id. at 1201. The dissent suggested that the majority simply failed to reconcile the conflict between the policies and provisions of the NLRA and the BRA,
preferring to focus on the policies and provisions of the BRA to the detriment of
the NLRA. Justice Brennan and his colleagues would make a stronger effort to reconcile the two statutory schemes. Id. at 1204 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissent reasoned that the best way to accomplish this goal was to first determine if the provisions of § 8(d) of the NLRA would apply to the debtor in possession in the absence of conflicting provisions of the BRA. The Justices concluded
that § 8(d) would apply. Id. at 1205. The definitional sections of the NLRA, the
view that the agreement remains in effect during the interim period, and the view
of the Board itself were all seen by the dissent as evidence that Congress intended
§ 8(d) to apply to a debtor in possession. Id. at 1205-07. In addition, the dissent
felt that the policies behind the NLRA (labor peace, prevention of economic warfare,
maintaining the free flow of commerce) required the provisions of § 8(d) to be followed
by the debtor in possession. Id. at 1207-09.
The dissenters failed to find any provision of the BRA that indicated an intent
to allow the debtor in possession to escape the requirements of the NLRA. Justice
Brennan concluded for the dissent that "[hiolding § 8(d) inapplicable in these
circumstances, however, strikes at the very heart of the policies underlying that section and the NLRA, and will, I believe, spawn precisely the type of industrial strife
that NLRA § 8(d) was designed to avoid." Id. at 1211.
120. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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consequences of such a liquidation on the debtor, creditors, and
employees. Also, the bankruptcy court must be persuaded that
reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification of the agreement have been made and are not likely to lead to a prompt and
satisfactory solution. The labor laws mandate that the employers and
unions reach their own agreements, and the bankruptcy court should
only be involved in this process if it appears that reorganization will
be compromised. If that point is reached, the bankruptcy court may
step in and authorize rejection, with a reasoned finding, on the record,
as to why rejection was allowed.' 21
The bankruptcy court has now been explicitly granted the power
to authorize the debtor in possession to reject collective bargaining
agreements. Since the provisions and policies of the bankruptcy code
provide that the collective bargaining agreement is not enforceable
post-petition,' 2 2 if the debtor in possession decides that he cannot wait
for the bankruptcy court's approval, he can refuse to follow the terms
of the agreement until final court approval and not commit an unfair labor practice.
The newest feature of the Court's test is the additional prerequisite
to a bankruptcy court's approval of rejection. The bankruptcy court
considering whether or not to allow rejection must first "be persuaded
that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been
made and are not likely to produce a prompt and satisfactory
solution."' 2 3 Fears that the Bildisco test places labor in an untenable
position when a bankruptcy petition is filed should be somewhat eased,
as a debtor in possession may have a difficult time obtaining court
approval for rejection if he cannot show that negotiation was at least
attempted. The Supreme Court was vague as to what constituted
negotiation efforts, indicating only that reasonable efforts are required,
and that bargaining to an impasse is not necessary.' 2 The courts below
will likely set a minimum requirement, perhaps demanding that the
negotiations be in good faith, with an eye towards actual compromise
and avoidance of rejection.

121. Id.at 1194-97.
122. Id. at 1197-1201. In contrast, the dissent maintained that the collective
bargaining agreement remained in effect after the filing of the bankruptcy petition
and until formal court approval or disapproval of rejection, and that any modification of the agreement made unilaterally by the debtor in possession during this period

is an unfair labor practice under the terms of the NLRA. Id.at 1201-11 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
123. Id.at 1196.
124. Id.at 1196-97.
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An inconsistency in the Court's opinion becomes apparent at this
point. The Court, in dismissing the Union's position that bargaining
to impasse must occur before rejection is allowed, stated that the determination of whether an impasse has been reached is to be made by
the NLRB. In the Court's view, requiring the bankruptcy courts to
make such a decision would "simply divert the Bankruptcy Court
from its customary area of expertise into a field in which it presumably
has little or none."' 5 Similarly, requiring the bankruptcy judges to
make a determination that reasonable efforts at negotiation have been
made would also move the court away from its field of expertise.
Perhaps the Court intended this seemingly inconsistent position as
a means of showing what was required in the way of "reasonable"
negotiations: the level of negotiation expected is far enough removed
from the "achieving impasse" level that the bankruptcy court will
not be diverted from its primary field of expertise in analyzing the
negotiations.
The Supreme Court also adopted the position that the collective
bargaining agreement is not enforceable during the period between
the petition for reorganization and final approval of a request to reject
the agreement. Since the agreement is not enforceable, if the debtor
in possession fails to negotiate with the union but merely breaches
the agreement after filing the bankruptcy petition, no unfair labor
practice has occurred and the NLRB cannot charge the debtor in
possession with a violation. However, the Court's requirement that
negotiations with the union must actually be undertaken eases the
sting of this seemingly harsh position. Merely showing the court that
negotiations would not have produced a satisfactory and prompt result
is not enough-the debtor in possession must actually attempt negotiation. Absent actual negotiation, the bankruptcy court cannot approve
rejection. Therefore, it is in the best interests of the debtor in possession to attempt to negotiate changes in a burdensome collective bargaining agreement in good faith, as, absent reasonable negotiations,
rejection of the agreement will not be approved.
Organized labor was greatly displeased by the Bildisco decision
and angrily denounced it. 2 ' However, in light of the overall judicial
agreement that collective bargaining agreements are executory contracts subject to rejection in a Chapter 11 reorganization, continued
argument on this position appears pointless. The test for rejection
125. Id. at 1200.
126. Elsasser, Bankruptcy Waters Muddied Further-HighCourt Labor Ruling
No Help in Clearing up Confusion, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 27, 1984, § 3 (Business),
at 1, col. 2.
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adopted by the Supreme Court attempts to balance the interests of
the debtor, creditors, and employees and provide for a greater degree
of negotiation prior to rejection than did the appellate court's Bildisco
test. This leaves the determination of exactly what level of negotiation is required prior to rejection open to the lower courts. Absent
legislation completely removing collective bargaining agreements from
the scope of the bankruptcy code, labor interests would best be served
by providing good faith alternatives to outright rejection and, in the
absence of agreement, arguing that the debtor in possession was not
faithfully negotiation a mutually acceptable solution. Taken in this
light, the NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco test provides a workable formulation which both labor and management can live with.
THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

On March 21, 1984, the House of Representatives passed by voice
vote the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984.127 It is a multipurpose
bill, making certain amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act and
providing for the appointment of United States Bankruptcy Court
judges under Article III of the Constitution. The amendments to the
BRA include changes regarding grain storage facilities and the personal bankruptcy law. Of immediate consequence to the Bildisco case
are the provisions contained in Title II, subtitle C, of H.R. 5174
entitled "Amendments Relating to Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements in Bankruptcy." 1 '28
The proposed amendments would substantially modify the NLRB
v. Bildisco & Bildisco'21 9 decision. This section will examine the details
of H.R. 5174 applicable to the issue raised in the Bildisco case, and
will discuss the effect these proposals would have on the decision.
Some predictions as to the final form of H.R. 5174 will be made.
The first proposed amendment relating to rejection of collective
bargaining agreements would amend section 365(a) of the BRA, 30
creating an additional exception to the types of executory contracts
which can be rejected under the authority of section 365(a).' 31 Another

127. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.,

130

CONG.

REc. H1832-45 (1984).

128. H.R. 5174, supra note 127, 130 CONG. REc. H1842-43.
129. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) currently reads "[e]xcept as provided in sections 765
and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee,
subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." Id. The proposed amendment would change this section
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amendment would change section 503(b)(1)(A) of the BRA and require
that administrative expenses for services rendered under a collective
bargaining agreement be measured at the rates prescribed by the
collective bargaining agreement. 32' An additional amendment would
create a new section in the bankruptcy code, section 1113, by which
rejection and assumption of collective bargaining agreements would
be governed.' 33 These proposed amendments, if enacted, would
significantly modify the Supreme Court's test for rejection of collective bargaining agreements as set out in the NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco opinion.
to read "except as provided in sections 765, 766, and 1113 of this title ...

."

H.R.

5174, supra note 127, § 275, 130 CONG. REc. H1842.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(A) currently states: "(b) After notice and a hearing,

there shall be allowed, administrative expenses . . . including-(l)(A) the actual,

necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case;". The proposed amendment would change the section to read "including wages, salaries, or
commissions for services rendered after the commencement of the case, except that
such wages or salaries covered by a collective bargaining agreement to which section
1113 of this title applies shall only be measured at the rate prescribed for such services in such agreement." H.R. 5174, supra note 127, § 276, 130 CONG. REc.
H 1842-43.
133. The new section would read:
§ 1113. Rejection of collective bargaining agreements
(a) For purposes of this section, "collective bargaining agreement"
means a collective bargaining agreement which is covered by title II of the
Railway Labor Act or the National Labor Relations Act.
(b) The trustee may reject or assume a collective bargaining agreement
under this title only if and after the court approves the rejection or assumption of such agreement.
(c) The court, only on the motion of the trustee, may approve the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under this title only after notice
to all parties in interest and a hearing.
(d)(l) The trustee shall(A) meet and confer in good faith with the authorized representative of the employees who are subject to a collective bargaining agreement;
and
(B) provide such authorized representative with the relevant
financial and other information.
(2) The trustee may file a motion for the rejection of a collective
bargaining agreement under this title if(A) the trustee has proposed modifications in such agreement
to such authorized representative deemed necessary by the trustee for successful financial reorganization of the debtor and preservation of the jobs
covered by such agreement;
(B) the trustee has considered but rejected as inadequate for
successful financial reorganization of the debtor and preservation of the
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H.R. 5174 v.

MAJORITY OPINION, PARTS

I & II

In Bildisco the Court concluded that it was the intent of Congress to include collective bargaining agreements covered by the NLRA
in section 365(a).' 34 The proposed amendment to section 365(a)'"1
specifically excludes collective bargaining agreements from the types
of executory contracts that are governed by that section. Also, section
1113(a) defines "collective bargaining agreement" as agreements
covered by both the NLRA and the RLA. Viewing these changes
together, the intent of the House appears to be that no form of
collective bargaining agreement is to be rejected or assumed under
the provisions of section 365(a). These changes, however, also create
an additional conflict between the bankruptcy and labor laws.
Notwithstanding the proposed changes in the BRA, section 1167
provides that changes in the terms or conditions of a collective bargaining agreement covered under the RLA shall be governed by section
6 of that act. This has been interpreted by the Court as including
changes occurring during the post-petition interim period. The new
jobs covered by such agreement alternative proposals for modifying such
agreement made by such authorized representatives; and
(C) a prompt hearing on rejection is necessary to successful
financial reorganization of the debtor.
(e) The court, upon motion of the trustee to reject a collective bargaining
agreement, shall hold an expedited hearing to determine whether such agreement may be rejected under this title, not less than 7 days and not more
than 14 days after the filing of such motion, or within such additional time
as the court, for cause, within such 14-day period fixes. Such hearing shall
be completed no later than 14 days after the commencement of such hearing, or within such additional time as the court, for cause, within such 14-day
period fixes.
(f) The financial information relevant to determining whether a collective bargaining agreement may be rejected under this title shall be made
available, under such conditions and within such time as the court may
specify, to the authorized representative of the employees who are subject
to such agreement.
(g) The court may not approve the rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement under this title unless(1) the trustee has complied with subsection (d) of this section; and
(2) absent rejection of such agreement, the jobs covered by such
agreement will be lost and any financial reorganization of the debtor will fail.
(h) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit the trustee
unilaterally to terminate or alter any of the wages, hours, terms and conditions established by a collective bargaining agreement.
H.R. 5174, supra note 127, § 277, 130 CONG. REC. H1842.
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1194-95.
135. Proposed 11 U.S.C. § 1113(g)(2). See supra note 133.
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additions to the BRA do not affect section 1167-its wording stands.
But the new additions to section 365(a) and new section 1113(a), when
read together, require interim changes or modifications of collective
bargaining agreements covered by the RLA to be governed by section
1113 of the BRA. The conflict, then, is which statute is to govern
the rejection of collective bargaining agreements covered by the RLAsection 6 of the RLA or section 1113 of the amended BRA?
It can be argued that the House, by its wording of section 1113(a),
intended that that section govern all collective bargaining agreements.
However, it could also be argued that the House was aware of the
provisions of section 1167 and intended, 'as a special deference to the
RLA, that modifications of a collective bargaining agreement covered
by the RLA during the post-petition period be governed by section
6 of that act. Alternatively, it could be argued that the discrepancy
was a mere oversight-e.g., a failure to amend section 1167. Whatever
the, reason for the existence of the conflict, the Senate can correct
the problem simply enough. If it is the desire of Congress that postpetition interim period modifications of all collective bargaining
agreements be governed by 1113 of the amended BRA, section 1167
should be amended to provide for this.
Rejection of a collective bargaining agreement under the proposed
section 1113 radically alters the Bildisco test. Section 1113(d)(1) and
(2) require that before a petition for rejection can even be filed, the
trustee must meet with the employees' representative, confer in good
faith, and provide the representative with relevant financial information. Before it can file the petition seeking rejection, the trustee must
propose modifications of the agreement to the representative and wait
for counter-proposals. The negotiation steps required by 1113(d)(2)
can be viewed in either of two ways: as an attempt by the House
to define the requirement of "reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification" set forth in the first element of the Bildisco rejection test; or as requirement that the parties "bargain to impasse,"
a result avoided by the Supreme Court. The bankruptcy court must
make the determination whether the requisite level of negotiations has
been met, as under 1113(d)(2) the court cannot otherwise allow the
trustee to file a motion for rejection. Requiring this level of bargaining
before the court can consider the issue of rejection necessarily pulls
the court into the labor negotiations field. Also, under 11 13(g)(1),
the court is not permitted to allow rejection unless the negotiations
required under 1113(d) are completed.
The "careful scrutiny and balancing of the equities" requirements
of the Supreme Court's rejection test are replaced by a more difficult
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rejection standard in 1113(g). In addition to the negotiations requirement of 11 13(g)(1) discussed above, the court cannot permit rejection
of the collective bargaining agreement unless, absent rejection of such
agreement, the jobs covered by such agreement will be lost and the
debtor's reorganization will fail. This is the test argued for by the
Union and NLRB in Bildisco and was the standard adopted by the
Second Circuit in REA Express. 36 The REA Express standard was
unanimously rejected by the Court in Bildisco as being at odds with
the policies of equity and flexibility built into the BRA and for
imposing an evidentiary burden on the debtor in possession that would
interfere with the reorganization process. 3 " It appears to be the intent
of the House to stress, by the use of the REA Express standard, the
policies of the labor acts instead of the policies behind the BRA.
H.R. 5174 v.

MAJORITY OPINION,

PART

III

In its majority opinion the Court held that the provisions of the
BRA evinced a congressional intent that an executory contract, and
therefore a collective bargaining agreement, would not be enforceable
post-petition. Section 1113 clarifies what Congress intended during
the post-petition period. Subsection (b) indicates that a collective
bargaining agreement cannot be rejected or assumed by the trustee
without court approval; subsection (e) requires an expedited hearing
concerning the disposition of the agreement; and subsection (h) prohibits a trustee from unilaterally terminating or altering a collective
bargaining agreement.' 3 While the precise status of the collective
bargaining agreement during the interim may not be entirely clear,
it is apparent that the House intends that the agreement remain in
effect until final judicial disposition.
The Supreme Court majority held that since the agreement was
not enforceable during the interim period, there could be no violation or enforcement of section 8(d) of the NLRA. No unfair labor
practice results from unilateral terminations or modifications as there
is no binding agreement in effect after the bankruptcy petition is
136. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164,
167-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975), 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
137. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.

138. H.R. 5174, supra note 127, § 277, 130 CONG. REC. H1842. See supra note
133. If the trustee cannot assume the agreement or reject the agreement before court..
approval, the status of the agreement prior to the court's action is somewhat in
limbo. Taking § 1113(h) into account, though, it is apparent that the House intends
the agreement to remain in effect. See supra note 119 for the Bildisco dissent's
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filed. 139 The provisions of section 1113 are amendments to the BRA,

not the NLRA or RLA. However, it is likely that if a collective
bargaining agreement is considered to be in effect, unilateral changes
in the agreement will be deemed to be an unfair labor practice. The
Supreme Court could not allow an unfair labor practice charge against
Bildisco because 8(d) requires an agreement to be "in effect" before
such a charge can be brought. The provisions of 1113 indicate that

the agreement is to be regarded as "in effect," meeting the prerequisite
to section 8(d).
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS: PREDICTIONS
As To THE FINAL FORM

The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984 and the Supreme
Court's Bildisco decision represent opposite poles of the rejection
issues. As the dissent in Bildisco pointed out, the majority decision
simply displaced the provisions of the NLRA with the provisions of

the BRA. Rejection under the Bildisco test serves the purposes of

the bankruptcy code while subordinating the policies behind the NLRA.

The dissent correctly pointed out that the majority did not attempt

to resolve the basic underlying conflict between the two statutory

schemes. As a result, H.R. 5174 was passed, apparently designed to
clarify congressional intent regarding rejection of collective bargaining
agreements.
discussion of the issue of whether the agreement remains in effect for the interim
period.
It appears that one of the intentions of the House is to reduce the "interim
period" between Chapter 11 filing and final court disposition of the collective bargaining agreement by providing for an expedited hearing. Under the proposed amendment, the hearing is to be held within 7 to 14 days after it is requested. However,
reviewing the extensive negotiation steps that must be taken before the expedited
hearing can even be requested leads to the conclusion that the practical results of
the new section may be somewhat different than intended.
The new section may also remove a time-saving provision available to the
employees under the current code. Assume, for example, that an employer is stalling
in negotiations for voluntary modifications of the agreement during the post-petition
interim period. Under the Bildisco test, these negotiations are required, but not until
after the petition for rejection is filed. Under the current § 365(d)(2), the other party
to an executory contract or collective bargaining agreement can request that the court
order the debtor in possession to reject or assume the contract within a certain period.
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1982).
The proposed amendments to § 365(a), removing collective bargaining agreements
from the family of executory contracts governed by § 365(a) arguably removes the
remedy provided by § 365(d)(2). See H.R. 5174, supra note 127, § 275, 130 CONG.
REC. H1842.
139. 104 S. Ct. at 1197-1201.
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The proposed amendments make rejection of a collective bargaining agreement extremely difficult. By requiring the debtor in possession to meet the REA Express standard of rejection, in addition to
substantial negotiation requirements, a debtor in possession may find
himself unable to reject an onerous agreement. Whether the final version of H.R. 5174 will carry the stringent requirements outlined above
is questionable. More likely than not a compromise will be reached.
One possible compromise would be to allow the bankruptcy court
to continue to use the Bildisco standard for rejection of the collective
bargaining agreement while requiring the debtor in possession to honor
the current agreement until the court gives final approval to rejection, or face unfair labor practice charges. While the debtor in possession would not be required to negotiate before requesting a hearing
on the question of rejection, the absence of negotiations by the debtor
would be a factor for the court to consider in determining whether
or not to allow rejection. An expedited hearing on a motion to reject
the agreement should be provided for at which the bankruptcy court
would examine the negotiation attempts made by the debtor. If the
debtor has not negotiated, the bankruptcy court could use the evidence
of an absence of negotiations to create a rebuttable presumption that
one of the debtor's purposes for reorganizing is to avoid the collective bargaining agreement. The presumption, if unrebutted, would
preclude rejection of the agreement.
Some form of compromise over the provisions of H.R. 5174 is
likely before the bill is passed in its final form. Whatever the final
provisions are, they should resolve the policy conflicts between the
NLRA and the BRA rather than subordinating the policy of one to
the other.*
ROBERT

E.

DOOLEY

* H.R. 5174 was approved, with modifications, on July 10, 1984. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).

